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Footnotes
1. David E. Sanger, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2005), at 1.
2. “There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term (enemy
combatant), and the Government has never provided any court
with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
3. The government offered the Fourth Circuit to submit an ex parte
supplemental attachment to its brief of a sealed declaration dis-
cussing determination of enemy combatant status that “‘specifi-
cally delineates the manner in which the military assesses and
screens enemy combatants to determine who among them should
be brought under Department of Defense Control’ and ‘describes
how the military determined that petitioner Hamdi fit the eligibil-
ity requirements applied to enemy combatants for detention.’”
The court rejected the declaration and ruled that it should have
been submitted to the district court.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d
278, 284 (4th Cir., 2002).  Two Newsweek correspondents,
Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, quoting anonymous
sources, insist alternatively that there was an “informal system”
for detaining American citizens as enemy combatants that was not
planned out, but “evolved in fits and starts.”  Michael Isikoff and
Daniel Klaidman, The Road to the Brig, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 26, 2004),
at 26.  They quote an anonymous source, a “top government attor-
ney,” as saying, “‘There is a sense in which we were making this
up as we went along, . . . .  ‘You have to remember we were deal-
ing with a completely new paradigm: an open-ended conflict, a
stateless enemy and a borderless battlefield.’”  Id. This article will
take the government at its word that such standards do exist and
are used in determining whether to detain American citizens as
enemy combatants, but have not yet been published for national
security or other reasons.  
4. Some writers believe that the hidden standards are part of a Bush
Administration veil of unprecedented secrecy related to govern-
ment acts and proceedings.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties:
Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement,
51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2004) citing Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d. 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N.J. Media Group v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d. 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Nat’l Security
Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d. 918 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
“We have met the enemy and he is us”
Walt Kelly, “Pogo”
On a clear, blue September morning in 2001, nineteenmen highjacked four commercial airplanes headedtoward the West Coast.  They crashed two into the
World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon
in Northern Virginia, and one into a Pennsylvania field.  In the
wake of the shocking attack, Congress authorized President
Bush to use military force against those who committed the
attack, commencing a “war on terror” that still rages today.  
The government has fought the “war on terror” on many
fronts.  The military is engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq; diplo-
matic overtures have been made to Libya and Pakistan; domes-
tic security is tighter; and safety procedures and citizen values
have changed, perhaps permanently.  American spies gather
intelligence all over the globe while even conversations by
United States citizens are monitored by the National Security
Agency for their content.1 During the course of the “war on
terror,” the United States military and the executive branch
have declared hundreds of individuals to be “unlawful enemy
combatants.”  One of these individuals is an American citizen
captured overseas, and one is an American citizen captured at
an airport in Chicago.
The government has standards for declaring citizens to be
enemy combatants.  There is a system to determine whether to
subject such combatants to the federal courts, or to military
tribunals, or to indefinite detention without charge.
Unfortunately, for the judiciary and the public, the government
has chosen to this point not to share those precise factors, not
even with the Supreme Court.2 The government has declared
in a brief to a circuit court that such standards do, in fact,
exist.3 The standards may be classified for national security
reasons.4 Alternatively, the government may have simply
failed to make the standards public to this point.  In the more
than five years since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
we have moved little closer to understanding what factors the
executive weighs in calculating whether to detain a United
States citizen indefinitely as an enemy combatant.  Until the
government chooses to share this information with the public,
an educated guess of what standards the government uses
must be deduced from the few statements thus far made on the
subject.
This paper will attempt to determine those standards.  The
decision likely involves four factors: (1) association with or
direct support of terrorist organization(s); (2) possession of
intelligence that would aid the United States if divulged via
interrogation; (3) continuing threat to the safety of United
States citizens or the national security of the United States; and
(4) it is in the interest of the United States to detain the person
as an enemy combatant.
The government should openly acknowledge and publish
its standards.  The United States has a storied tradition of mak-
ing punishment fit the crime and of publishing the standards
to which citizens are held.  The standards that the United
States uses to determine that one of its citizens is an enemy
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combatant are not merely important as a diagnostic legal exer-
cise.  At stake is America’s example to developing democracies
of an open, honest, and fair balance of freedom and security.
Many nations look to the United States as a model.  If the
United States hides the standards used to detain citizens, other
nations may use that secrecy to justify their own actions.
This article does not analyze the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Hamdi and Padilla to determine whether the Court made the
right calculus or found the right balance.  Nor does this article
attempt to parse whether the United States may detain non-
citizens indefinitely as enemy combatants or the complex issue
of military tribunals.  Rather this paper attempts to reveal how
the United States justifies detaining her own citizens, some-
times captured on United States soil and sometimes showing
little or no signs of imminent harm.  If these detentions occur
in the shadows, gaining strength and legitimacy in current and
future administrations, more and more American citizens may
find themselves risking loss of civil liberties.  When those who
govern have absolute power to detain those that are a threat to
their government, they may take liberties with that power.  The
United States has not yet published the calculus it uses before
detaining its own citizens.  By determining what those stan-
dards are, the public can hold government to the correct appli-
cation of the standards.  Sunlight on the standards may be our
“best disinfectant.”5
I. THREE UNITED STATES CITIZEN ENEMY-
COMBATANT CASES
Although there have been hundreds of declared enemy
combatants, only two announced detainees are United States
citizens.  The comparison of the two, Yaser Hamdi and Jose
Padilla, as well as John Walker Lindh, a citizen who was not
detained as an enemy combatant, may reveal the standards
used to determine whether to declare a citizen to be an enemy
combatant. 
A.  Yaser Hamdi
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Saudi national who was born in
Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia as a young boy, was cap-
tured in late 2001 by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and
was subsequently turned over to the United States military.6
Hamdi was interrogated and then transported to a United
States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.7 When the gov-
ernment learned that Hamdi was a United States citizen, it
transferred him to a naval brig in Virginia, then to a naval brig
in South Carolina.8 Never charged with a crime, Hamdi
remained in confinement until his October 11, 2004, release to
Saudi Arabia under a plea
agreement.9 The United
States military determined
Hamdi to be an unlawful
enemy combatant, and the
government never brought
criminal or civil charges
against him.  
Hamdi’s father, Esam
Fouad Hamdi, filed a habeas
petition as next friend.10 In
response, the government
filed a declaration from Michael Mobbs, special advisor to the
undersecretary of defense for policy.11 The government chose
not to provide the specific standards used to determine that
Hamdi was an enemy combatant.  The only clue to those stan-
dards comes from the Mobbs declaration.  
After declaring himself familiar with the rules and policy of
detention and combatant status and Hamdi’s situation in par-
ticular, Mobbs wrote that Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan in
July or August 2001, affiliated with the Taliban, and received
weapons training.12 Hamdi’s unit was captured by the
Northern Alliance, to whom he surrendered a Kalashnikov
rifle.13 Hamdi, who spoke English, was interviewed by the
United States military and determined to be an enemy com-
batant, an assessment affirmed by a military screening team.14
In January 2002, the Commander, U.S. Central Command’s
Detainee Review and Screening Team found that Hamdi met
established enemy-combatant criteria.15 The declaration does
not state what those standards and criteria are.
The Eastern District of Virginia ordered the government to
produce certain documents that would validate holding Hamdi
as an enemy combatant.16 The government appealed this deci-
sion to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed and dismissed
Hamdi’s habeas-corpus petition.17 Hamdi’s petition for a
rehearing or a rehearing en banc was denied, but the Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit to hear
his appeal.
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Hamdi does not
conclusively determine whether the Constitution always pro-
vides the executive with detention power.  In Hamdi, the Court
ruled that Congress authorized detention by its Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (A.U.M.F.).18 Though the
A.U.M.F. does not specifically authorize detention, “detention
to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a funda-
mental incident of waging war” authorized by the A.U.M.F.19
Necessary and appropriate force includes detaining Taliban
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33. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 581-599 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
34. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 710-724.
35. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451.
36. Id. at 442.
37. Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Padilla) (Aug. 27, 2002)  CBS
NEWS WEBSITE, available at http://www .cbsnews.com/htdocs/
pdf/padillamobbs.pdf (Last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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43. Id.
members.20 Detained citi-
zens must receive notice of
the reasons for their classifi-
cation and be heard before a
neutral decision maker in a
meaningful time and man-
ner to satisfy due-process
requirements.21
Not long after the
Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, Yaser Hamdi was
freed to Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, as part of a plea bargain that required that he renounce
terrorism, surrender his United States passport, agree not to
sue the United States government, and refrain from traveling to
the United States and other denoted areas for some time.22
B.  Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Mujahir, the so-
called “dirty bomber,”23 was arrested May 8, 2002, at O’Hare
International Airport on a federal material-witness warrant
after stepping off of a flight from Pakistan to Chicago.24
Apparently, Padilla was carrying a valid passport at the time,
which he had received two months earlier.25 He cleared immi-
gration and had his passport stamped “admitted.”26 He was
detained at the customs area, where customs agents and then
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents questioned him.27 After
declining to continue the interview without the representation
of an attorney, he was presented with a subpoena issued in the
Southern District of New York.28 Padilla was brought to New
York under federal custody.29 On June 9, 2002, President Bush
directed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to designate
Padilla an enemy combatant and have him detained.30
The government vacated the material-witness warrant and
informed the court it was taking Padilla into military custody.31
The military transported Padilla to the Consolidated Naval
Brig in South Carolina.32 Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman,
sought a writ of habeas corpus as next friend, and the district
court determined that Padilla had the right to monitored
access to counsel and that the government had the right to
detain a combatant captured in the United States, in review of
which it would apply a “some evidence” standard.33 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court rul-
ing on jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
but reversed on the merits, stating that although it would grant
the executive great deference, the President did not have con-
gressional authority to detain Padilla; the Second Circuit
remanded with instructions to transfer Padilla to civil authori-
ties for criminal charges.34 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
did not reach the merits of whether the President could detain
American citizens captured within the United States as enemy
combatants, but instead remanded to the district court to dis-
miss without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.35 The Court
ruled that the commander of Padilla’s brig was the proper
respondent to a habeas-corpus motion.36
Like in Hamdi’s petition, the government submitted a dec-
laration from Michael Mobbs.  Mobbs recited his qualifications
within the government and said that he had reviewed Padilla’s
file.37 Mobbs’s declaration reveals the information given to
President Bush before he determined Padilla to be an enemy
combatant.  Padilla was born in New York, convicted of mur-
der in approximately 1983, and imprisoned until age 18, after
which he was convicted of a handgun charge and impris-
oned.38 Padilla converted to Islam in prison.39 He traveled to
Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, where he asso-
ciated with members and leaders of Al Qaida and met with Abu
Zubaydeh (a senior lieutenant of Osama bin Laden).40 Along
with an unnamed associate, Padilla “approached Zubaydeh
with their proposal to conduct terrorist operations within the
United States.  Zubaydeh directed Padilla and his associate to
travel to Pakistan for training from Al Qaida operatives in
wiring explosives.”41 Padilla researched uranium-enhanced
explosives and planned to “build and detonate a ‘radiological
dispersal device’ (also known as a dirty bomb) within the
United States, possibly in Washington, DC.”42 This plan was
still in the planning stages and Padilla had other plans to
explode gas stations and hotel rooms.43 The declaration does
not reflect Padilla’s ability to actually carry out any of the dis-
cussed operations, how close he was to beginning his opera-
tions, or whether the information and training he had received
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62. The United States Navy Destroyer Cole was bombed while refuel-
ing in Yemen.  Jose Martinez, MIDEAST CRISIS; Tight-knit Naval
Community Reels from Sad News, THE BOSTON HERALD (Oct. 13,
2000), at 34.
from Al Qaeda was anything
more than common knowl-
edge about explosives.
In July 2004, Padilla filed
a petition for habeas corpus
in the District of South
Carolina, where he was still
being held in a military
brig.44 The district court
found that while the
A.U.M.F. made Hamdi’s
detention on the battlefield of Afghanistan appropriate, detain-
ing Padilla in a United States airport was not equally appropri-
ate.45 Padilla, captured domestically, had his terrorist plans
thwarted by the capture, and there “were no impediments
whatsoever to the government bringing charges against him
for any one or all of the array of heinous crimes that he has
been effectively accused of committing.”46 The court listed
several federal laws that the government could use to prose-
cute Padilla, instead of endless detention.47 The district court
thus concluded that the A.U.M.F. did not authorize detention
of an American citizen captured domestically and that this
enemy-combatant detention violated the non-detention act.48
The Fourth Circuit disagreed.  In reversing the district
court, the circuit concluded that the President possesses
authority to detain a United States citizen captured domesti-
cally as an enemy combatant pursuant to the A.U.M.F.49 The
court went on to find no “difference in principle” between
Hamdi and Padilla.50 In reversal, the circuit court denied that
the simple availability of the criminal laws cited by the district
court is determinative of the detention power “if for no other
reason than that criminal prosecution may well not achieve the
very purpose for which detention is authorized in the first
place—the prevention of return to the field of battle.”51 The
court added that requiring the government to use the criminal-
justice system would “impede the Executive in its efforts to
gather intelligence from the detainee and to restrict the
detainee’s communication with confederates so as to ensure
that the detainee does not pose a continuing threat to national
security even as he is confined.”52
Padilla appealed to the Supreme Court, and the case seemed
on a sure track to consideration when the government indicted
Padilla in a federal court in Miami, Florida, and sought his
transfer from military detention to the federal prison system.
The indictment did not repeat the familiar accusation that
Padilla would attempt to detonate a “dirty bomb” in an
American city, but instead argued that he was part of a “‘North
American support cell’ to send ‘money, physical assets and new
recruits overseas to engage in acts of terrorism and that he had
traveled abroad himself to become ‘a violent jihadist.’”53
The Fourth Circuit did not take kindly to the government’s
decision to place Padilla in the civilian criminal-justice system
after its strong opinion upholding the government’s right to
detain United States citizens as enemy combatants.  The judges
refused to approve Padilla’s transfer, calling that transfer and
the request that the Fourth Circuit withdraw its opinion a
compounding of “what is, in the absence of explanation, at
least an appearance that the government may be attempting to
avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.”54
The opinion excoriated the government at several different
points for an apparent effort to avoid the potential that the
Supreme Court would reverse the earlier Fourth Circuit deci-
sion and further restrict the government’s power to detain
United States citizens.55 The Supreme Court reversed and
ordered that the unopposed request to transfer Padilla to civil-
ian custody be approved; the Court said that it would “con-
sider the pending petition for certiorari in due course,” but
later denied certiorari.56 In August 2007, Padilla was con-
victed in a federal jury trial in Florida on terrorism conspiracy
charges.57
C.  John Walker Lindh
American citizen John Walker Lindh was captured in
Afghanistan on December 1, 2001, fighting for the Taliban
against the Northern Alliance, a United States ally.58 Lindh
grew up in affluent Marin County, California, and was named
after Beatles singer John Lennon and United States Supreme
Court Justice John Marshall.59 Between the ages of 16 and 18,
Lindh converted to Islam, referred to himself as Sulayman Al-
Lindh, and left for Yemen to learn the language of the Koran.60
Lindh’s parents supported him on this journey.61
A month after the U.S.S. Cole was bombed,62 Lindh left
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Washington, DC (Feb. 24, 2004) at 7-10.  Available at
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ited, Jan. 5, 2005).
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Yemen to attend an Islamic Madrasah in Bannu, Pakistan.63
Lindh trained in a camp in Pakistan of the Harakat ul-
Mujahideen (designated in 1997 by the United States as a for-
eign terrorist organization) as well as other training camps.64
He met and spoke with Osama bin Laden, but when asked,
chose to decline an offer to participate in bombing operations
against the United States, Israel, and Europe.65 Lindh received
weapons training and training in “orientating, navigation,
explosives, and battlefield combat.”66 When he was captured,
Lindh was interrogated but was not declared an enemy com-
batant.  Instead, he was transported to the United States and
charged with a 10-count federal indictment in the Eastern
District of Virginia.67 The district court denied Lindh’s motion
to be treated as a lawful combatant, reasoning that on February
7, 2002 (after Lindh’s capture), the President had declared all
members of the Taliban to be unlawful combatants as he was
authorized to do by the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force.”68 Rather than go to trial, Lindh and the government
reached a plea bargain reflected in his October 4, 2002 sen-
tencing.69
II. STANDARDS AND CRITERIA USED BY THE U.S. TO
DETERMINE ENEMY-COMBATANT STATUS
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the executive estab-
lished rules and standards for detaining enemy combatants.  It
had been many years since a citizen was declared an enemy
combatant, and that was a different situation.  In World War II,
America had clear enemies with uniformed armies and terri-
tory.  Conversely, the “war on terror” is linguistically a war on
a tactic (terrorism), not a war against a nation or people
(Afghanistan or Southern Confederates).  
The government has admitted that “‘given its unconven-
tional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a for-
mal cease-fire agreement.’”70 The “war on terror” is a war that
will have no clear end.  Soon after the attacks, the White House
made a clear statement on detention, treatment, and trial of
noncitizens captured as part
of the “war on terror,”71 but
did not publish standards
about detention, treatment,
or trial of similarly captured
citizens. The executive
branch’s only other pub-
lished standards also involve
only noncitizen enemy com-
batants.72 In the Military
Commissions Act of 2006,73
Congress defined unlawful enemy combatants74 for the pur-
pose of exposure to trial by military commissions75 and
removal of habeas-corpus jurisdiction,76 but only as applied to
alien unlawful-enemy combatants.
The President’s advisors likely constructed the authority to
detain citizens as enemy combatants based on the Court’s
Quirin decision, which stated “[c]itizenship in the United
States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him of the con-
sequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in vio-
lation of the law of war.”77 While the standards for declaring
a citizen to be an enemy combatant have not been published,
former Attorney General and Counsel to the President Alberto
Gonzalez discussed the system in place to determine status of
citizens.  The Department of Justice “first reviews each case to
determine whether a citizen meets the criteria to be an ‘enemy
combatant.’  After that . . . the secretary of defense and the CIA
both review the case, and then turn it back to the attorney gen-
eral for a second review” by Justice.78 There is a separate fac-
tual review by the Criminal Division of the Justice Department,
after which the attorney general provides legal advice to the
defense secretary on enemy-combatant classification.79 A
package is sent to the President for a final decision on enemy-
combatant status.80 Gonzalez claimed in his speech that there
was no “rigid process for making [enemy-combatant] determi-
nations.”81 Though Gonzalez described the system for making
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American citizens.  See Generally Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed Sweet
Land of Liberty WASH. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2002), at A19; Anita
Ramasastry, Why Ashcroft’s Plan to Create Internment Camps for
Alleged Enemy Combatants Is Wrong, Find Law Forum, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK WEBSITE (Sept. 4, 2002), available at,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/columns/fl.ramasastry.d
etainees/ (last visited, Feb. 25, 2007); Jess Bravin, More Terror
Suspects May Sit in Limbo, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2002), at 4 (dis-
cussing Attorney General John Ashcroft’s short-lived plan in
2002 to create internment camps within the United States to
house citizens who would be declared enemy combatants).
84. 18 U.S.C. 4001 (2004).
85. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519-524.
86. See Generally David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(2003) (discussing the government’s tactics in the “war on ter-
ror” as an “evolution of political repression” and detailing the
manner in which these restrictions may violate the First
Amendment right to assemble).
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the determination and how
different segments of the
executive branch commu-
nicate in making the deter-
mination, he did not detail
the standards that the exec-
utive branch uses in mak-
ing the determinations.
That most important aspect
still remains veiled from
the public’s view.
The executive believes
that statutory authority to detain citizens as enemy combatants
derives from two statutes, the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force”82 and “Armed Forces General Military Law: Military
Correctional Facilities.”83 In 1971, Congress amended the
United States Code in this area because, in looking back at what
happened to Japanese-Americans in internment camps, it
wished to declare the intent of Congress that “[n]o citizen shall
be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”84 The Hamdi Court accepted
the argument that detention of individuals declared to be enemy
combatants for the duration of the conflict during which they
are captured is part of the President’s authorized use of military
force.85 This article, accepting the Court’s analysis that the exec-
utive has such a power, concentrates on the standards used to
apply the power.
Although the standards have not been published or made
available, an analysis of the accusations against citizen enemy
combatants seems to yield four factors that the executive con-
siders in making a determination that a citizen is an enemy com-
batant.  Those factors are: (1) association with or direct support
of terrorist organization(s); (2) possession of intelligence that
would aid the United States if divulged via interrogation; (3)
continuing threat to the safety of United States citizens or the
national security of the United States; and (4) it is in the inter-
est of the United States to detain as an enemy combatant.
A. Factor I:  Association with or Direct Support of
Terrorist Organization(s)
It is unclear what level of association or support of a terror-
ist group is necessary to trigger enemy-combatant status.  It is
also unclear whether this factor violates the First Amendment
right to association.86 Padilla is alleged to have met with Al
Qaeda leaders and plotted ways to trigger a dirty bomb in an
American city.  Hamdi is alleged to have fought for the Taliban,
but there is no evidence that he affiliated with Al Qaeda.  In
contrast, Lindh trained with Harakat ul-Mujahideen and met
with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.  It is not apparent why
Hamdi’s association with the Taliban triggered enemy-combat-
ant status while Lindh’s association with two declared terrorist
groups, one of which attacked America on September 11, did
not.  Though association with or support of a terrorist organi-
zation seems to be a factor that the government considers in
determining whether to detain a United States citizen as an
enemy combatant, the amount of contact or support necessary
to trigger this determination is unclear from the small sample
of cases discussed here.
B. Factor II:  Possession of Intelligence That Would
Aid the United States If Divulged
The Supreme Court, in dicta,87 has hinted that the mere
possibility of interrogation may not be sufficient for indefinite
detention of an enemy combatant:  “Certainly, we agree that
indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not
authorized.”88 This is curious, as the Fourth Circuit under-
stood that it was because the government believed “that
Hamdi’s detention is necessary for intelligence gathering
efforts, [that] the United States has determined that Hamdi
should continue to be detained as an enemy combatant in
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89. Hamdi, 296 F.3d. at 280.
90. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).
91. U.S. CONST., amend. V.  “. . . nor shall [a person] be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”
92. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1621-1630, 1642-1643 (2004)
(discussing erosion of the bright line between government powers
previously used only in foreign operations, and their application
by the Bush Administration to domestic actions, and listing exam-
ples).  See also Taylor, supra note 78, at 28-29 (2004) (the gov-
ernment’s position, during oral arguments in Padilla’s Second
Circuit hearing, was that since al Qaeda attacked in the United
States, the United States should be included in the “war on terror”
battlefield); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429 (2003) (“In previous American
conflicts, hostilities were limited to a foreign battlefield while the
United States’ home front remained safe behind two oceans.  In
this conflict, the battlefield can occur anywhere, and there can be
no strict division between the front and home”).
93. For instance, knowledge of chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons and the ability to utilize that knowledge toward immi-
nent destructive ends would represent a continuing threat.
accordance with the laws and customs of war.”89 The govern-
ment should cite another purpose besides that of interrogation
if they are to hold an enemy combatant indefinitely without
charge or trial.  This dicta was written after both Hamdi and
Padilla were declared to be enemy combatants, so it is possible
that interrogation was the sole purpose for detaining one or
both as enemy combatants, but that standard alone should not
be used prospectively to detain citizens as enemy combatants.
In the same opinion, the Court acknowledged the “weighty
and sensitive governmental interest in ensuring that those who
have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return
to battle against the United States.”90 This statement values
detention in the case of a ticking time-bomb-type detainee over
the simple intelligence value of a detainee.
It is noteworthy that there is no public record of other citi-
zens being declared enemy combatants in the years after
Hamdi and Padilla were detained, even though others were
arrested while planning or attempting to execute attacks or for
aiding or supporting terrorist groups.
Though there is no conclusive evidence that this is the case,
perhaps the mere threat of being declared an enemy combatant
is enough to encourage a captured citizen to cooperate and
provide any information the government desires, lest they be
swept off to a military brig in South Carolina.  Simple human
nature may cause a detainee to choose to assist the government
and take their chances in the civilian criminal-justice system,
rather than risk refusing to cooperate and facing enemy-com-
batant detention in a military brig.  
It is an open question whether such a threat, if it is used or
implied, is proper.  While citizens faced with the possibility of
being held incommunicado may be more likely to provide
information that can be used to protect and save lives, there are
two dangers that may accompany such protection.  One dan-
ger is the loss of the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination,91 which is eviscerated by such a threat.  While
those being interrogated still have the right to remain silent,
doing so may cost them other constitutional rights, and so may
not be a practical option.  The other danger is a creeping
expansion of the use of the threat.92 There is no clear backstop
for which the threat of a declaration of enemy combatant sta-
tus could not be used to soften up a suspect.  If the government
arrests a petty thief and member of a local Islamic organization
that has sent funds to al Qaeda, who possesses intelligence
about the organization, the threat of enemy-combatant deten-
tion could be used to force an allocution and plea.  Although
the charge, burglary or larceny,
may have nothing to do with the
suspect’s beliefs on terrorism or
his financing of terrorist organi-
zations, he would fit all the
parameters discussed earlier:
association with and support of
a terrorist organization, posses-
sion of intelligence that would
aid the United States if divulged,
continued threat to safety of
United States citizens, and
detention being in the interest of
the United States.  We must
carefully draw the line to ensure
that criminals who are not
themselves terrorists are not threatened with a declaration of
enemy-combatant status.
C. Factor III:  Continuing Threat to the Safety of
United States Citizens
It is difficult for the government to determine with certainty
that a person is a continuing threat, and it is just as difficult to
determine when that person is no longer a threat.  This factor,
like that of “association” or “support of a terrorist organiza-
tion,” is mainly gray area.  No available standards reveal just
how dangerous a threat must be to require detention.  
Could it be that the level of threat a person presents requires
a crude cost-benefit-type analysis that involves multiplying the
number of people in danger by the time remaining until their
harm?  At a certain level, the amount of harm multiplied by its
imminence is so grave that the government must detain the cit-
izen indefinitely.  Yet it is not clear how the government could
value each factor.  Would they first detain a terrorist who will
kill ten people in one hour, one who would kill 100 people in
a year, or one who would kill 1,000 people in ten years?
Which presents the greater threat to society?  How can the
government determine when the threat has passed?  
If the person possesses knowledge that continues to present
a danger no matter how long he or she is detained,93 may the
government detain that person for life without adjudication?
The executive may feel it has no choice.  Since presentation of
continuing danger is extremely subjective, the government
must reveal its standards so as to ensure honest and consistent
application.
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Court Review 147
148 Court Review 
D. Factor IV:  Detention Is
in the Interests of the
United States
This final factor is the
scariest for civil libertarians
and open-government sup-
porters.  It is nearly impossi-
ble to quantify when the
“interests” of the United
States merit detaining a citizen as an enemy combatant.  The
fourth factor may even subsume the first three.  This factor,
when combined with the other abstract factors, provides the
government with too much leniency in making a determina-
tion.  If the President is empowered to determine both what the
standards are for the interests of the United States and who
among us fit the standards, he or she acts as legislator, execu-
tive, and judiciary.  Too much power is concentrated in the
executive branch in making such determinations using broad,
unpublished standards.
Some argue that the government detained Hamdi and
Padilla as enemy combatants because they did not have suffi-
cient evidence to ensure a conviction in an Article III court.94
The secrecy that surrounded the two detained citizens leaves
no public record of the evidence that the government had on
either man outside of the Mobbs declarations.  Others who
associate or support terrorist organizations, or have intelli-
gence value, or are a continuing threat to the United States,
have been tried in federal courts.  Yet Hamdi and initially
Padilla were not.  
The only evidence the government initially provided, even
to the Supreme Court, was a declaration that was essentially a
hearsay review of the detainee’s files, meaning that it was pos-
sible that the government did not have enough evidence on
either man to satisfy federal evidentiary requirements.  This
would be a drastic accusation against the government, but
Hamdi’s release soon after the Supreme Court ruled that he had
a right to judicial review certainly does not negate it.  Padilla’s
transfer to a civilian court in Florida to face a federal indict-
ment just before the government’s briefs were due in his appeal
to the Supreme Court seemed not to, either, but he has since
been convicted of conspiracy to commit several terrorist acts.   
In both cases, the government argued vehemently that it
must detain these individuals, in military prisons and without
access to counsel, because of their grave danger to society.  Yet
in both cases, when it appeared as though the courts would
find a lack of evidence or force the government to defend these
detentions, the government quickly shifted course and either
released the detainee or transferred them back to the civilian
criminal-justice system that it had previously called
unequipped to handle such a detainee.  If history proves this
theory correct in documents released in the future and mem-
oirs written by today’s decision makers, many Americans may
lose faith in our system of justice.  Few would trust an execu-
tive branch that perversely seeks to indefinitely detain citizens
for which it does not have evidence sufficient to try and convict
in the civilian criminal-justice system.
To this end, Hamdi and Padilla are not the only individuals
accused of nefarious acts and attempted acts of terrorism.
Several other citizens and noncitizens of equal or greater dan-
ger and intelligence value were tried in federal courts.  Both
Richard Reid, who attempted to destroy an American Airlines
flight from Paris to Miami via a crudely made shoe bomb,95 and
his accomplice, Saajid Badat, who possessed explosives in his
home and allegedly assisted Reid while planning his own shoe
bombing at a later date,96 were arrested and charged in federal
court.  Ryan Anderson, a member of the National Guard, was
arrested before deployment to Iraq on “criminal charges of aid-
ing the enemy by wrongfully attempting to communicate and
give intelligence to the al Qaeda terrorist network.”97 Yassin
Muhiddin Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain, members
of a mosque in Albany, New York, who were accused of
attempting to sell to terrorists a shoulder-fired grenade
launcher, were charged in federal court with “concealing mate-
rial support for terrorism and participating in a money-laun-
dering conspiracy.”98 Gale Nettles, a convicted felon who used
the name Ben Laden, was arrested and charged in federal court
after filling a rented storage facility with 500 pounds of fertil-
izer that he intended to use to bomb the Dirksen Federal
Courthouse building in Chicago, a clear attempt at domestic
terrorism.99 Ramzi Yousef, convicted in federal court for mas-
terminding the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade
Center, was never declared to be an enemy combatant,
although Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wished
to have him so declared.100
It is a mystery why these individuals, some of whom were
further along in planning a terrorist act, or even caught in the
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information. E.g. The Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App. III.”  Padilla, 389 F. Supp.2d. at 692
n.13.  The district court added that enemy-combatant detention
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ment officials, civilian law enforcement officials.  He was
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act, like the “shoe bomber” Reid, were not declared enemy
combatants.  Perhaps an aspect of Padilla’s detention was so
dangerous that if revealed, it would present a grave danger.
Perhaps that danger has passed, allowing Padilla to be tried in
federal court.  Perhaps the evidence initially used to hold
Padilla as an enemy combatant was insufficient to attain a con-
viction in federal court.  Or perhaps a threat of an enemy-com-
batant declaration has been sufficient to elicit cooperation
from all others arrested in the “war on terror.”
III. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DETAIN CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS?
The short answer to this question should be no.  The United
States has a strong legal and judicial system, a system that is
well capable of protecting the state’s interest in safety from ter-
rorism while safeguarding the rights of the detained.101 Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hamdi argued that the A.U.M.F.
did not authorize enemy-combatant detention, and it further
cited several statutes that federal prosecutors could use against
citizen terrorists and suspected terrorists instead of detaining
them as enemy combatants.102 Some accused terrorists cap-
tured by the United States or allied governments have been
successfully prosecuted in Article III courts.  These courts have
capably balanced the sensitivity of the defendant’s potentially
dangerous knowledge and presentation of continuing danger
with their constitutionally guaranteed rights to a fair and
speedy trial and representation by counsel.
The secretive standards for detaining United States citizens
as enemy combatants, on the other hand, are filled with pitfalls
and dangers to both public safety and civil liberties.  Some of
the problems with secretive enemy-combatant detention come
from denying citizens the civil liberties that we have come to
expect in this country.  Yet there is the additional public-rela-
tions problem, both within the United States and outside of its
borders.  Even if the government does its utmost to preserve
and protect the civil liberties of detainees—and does in fact
only detain citizens as enemy combatants when it has impec-
cable proof—the fear that the system is not so pure, and the
government’s reluctance thus far to disprove that fear, com-
pounds this public-relations nightmare and leads some to
believe that the government is overstepping its constitutionally
granted power and violating citizens’ civil liberties.
IV. THE MATTER OF THE
MODEL
One reason the government
should detail its process and
method used to determine the
enemy-combatant status of
citizens is to inform those who
may commit future acts.
Although it seems illogical,
terrorists and potential terror-
ists should know the stan-
dards they will be judged by
so they can consider both
those standards and that judg-
ment before they plan and act.
Open standards and disinterested arbiters of those standards
are part of our rule-of-law tradition; this may well be the “free-
dom” we fight for in the “war on terror.”
Of course, some might argue that muddled, confusing, and
shifting standards provide a better deterrent against a shadowy
enemy.  Perhaps not knowing what they will be arrested for
and how they will be treated is more of a deterrent than 
definitive knowledge that grave actions will carry grave conse-
quences.  Yet even if effective, that tactic pulls our government
away from its historical tradition of the rule of law.  If the gov-
ernment keeps its citizen-detention standards a mystery, it will
exchange our inherent moral compass for a tactic that has not
been proven effective.  As a tactic, mysterious standards may
be effective in the short run, but in the long run, they are self-
defeating.  Shrouding the substantive standards used by the
government in mystery may cause us to lose a chance at deter-
rence and may harm the global view of the United States.  
Dean Peter Raven-Hansen has made the important point
that “‘you can look it up’ is an Americanism central to the rule
of law and lawmaking.  Yet, while a non-citizen could look up
the November 13 Order in the Federal Register,103 United
States citizens Hamdi and Padilla, ironically, could not look up
the law governing their detention before the Hamdi deci-
sion.”104
Sunlight cast on these standards would not really be for the
sake of those individual terrorists and potential terrorists (who
are not likely to be deterred by reading published standards),
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but should be published for the sake of fledgling and develop-
ing democracies, who model their actions and laws after those
of the United States.  The rule of law and the Constitution are
examples to be dispersed across the world.  The Court wrote in
Milligan of the power of punishment through the law “no mat-
ter how great an offender the individual may be, or how much
his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the coun-
try, or endangered its safety.  By the protection of the law
human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they
are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited
people.”105
More than a century later, Ronald Reagan and others spoke
of America as a “shining city upon a hill” that is “still a beacon,
still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pil-
grims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the
darkness, toward home.”106 Even if no law requires the gov-
ernment to publish these standards, the United States—the
“shining city upon a hill”—has a moral imperative to share its
standards.  
Sharing standards also means sharing America’s values.  No
country stands before the United Nations to argue for the right
to declare political dissidents to be enemy combatants based
on little proof of wrongdoing simply because the governments
of Syria, Iran, or North Korea do so.  Yet, if they can make that
argument using a United States example, the cause of liberty
worldwide is damaged.  Additionally, emerging democracies
often base their constitution and governmental system at least
in part on that of the United States.  A clear, open model can
shape the detention standards of frail emerging democracies
like those in Afghanistan and Iraq.  While we can be fairly con-
fident that our executive branch is careful to balance national
security with civil liberties, it is all too easy in developing
countries for leaders to deal with dissent via the proverbial
“knock on the door in the night,” and then to detain citizens
based on scant evidence for which the writ of habeas corpus,
the most important of rights, is so necessary to protect
against.107
Thus there are two reasons for the United States to release
the standards it uses to detain citizens as enemy combatants.
The first is the importance to our nation and the world of
morally clear rule-of-law decisions.  The second reason is for
democracies around the world who look to the United States
as a model and pattern their actions after ours.  In being open
and honest about the standards it uses to detain its own citi-
zens, the United States can address and ensure the strength of
its own democracy and that of dozens of democracies develop-
ing across the globe.
In the century before last, the Court wrote that “it is very
evident that the common laws of war—those maxims of
humanity, moderation, and honor—ought to be observed by
both parties in every civil war. Should the sovereign conceive
he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite
party will make reprisals.”108 If the United States upholds
strict standards, it has the moral force to hold other nations to
the same strict standards.  If the government were more open
about the standards and factors it uses to determine when it
has the unilateral right to whisk a citizen away to a military
brig, world leaders who detain their citizens could not use our
secrecy to justify their own.  Whatever the standards are for
detaining American citizens as enemy combatants, the United
States should publish and clarify those standards so both its
own citizens, and those of the rest of the world, will know the
standards by which they are judged.
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